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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 990902-CA

v.
DANIEL LEE ALLEN,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals an order requiring him to pay restitution following his
convictions for aggravated assault, a second degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5103 (1999) and unlawful detention, a Class B Misdemeanor under 76-5-304 (1999) This
Court has jurisdiction of the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court retain jurisdiction over the probationer to
enforce restitution when it never entered a signed order
terminating probation?

Whether a court has personal jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. State v. Dickev. 841 P.2d 1203,1204 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied.
853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). A trial court's restitution order will not be disturbed on

appeal unless the court exceeded the authority prescribed by law or abused its
discretion. State v. McBride. 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah App.), cert denied. 953
P.2d 449 (Utah 1997); State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah App. 1993),
cert, denied. 876 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). "However, this court may find an abuse
of discretion only if we conclude that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view
adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App.
1997) (citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(ii)(A) (1995) provides as follows:
If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as
defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case
and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of
enforcing the payment of the account receivable.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1
On May 6, 1996, while in Kimberly Peterson's home, defendant smothered Ms.
Peterson with a pillow, choked her with a cord, and prevented her from escaping or using
the telephone. Two days later, he was charged with one count of aggravated assault, a
second degree felony, two counts of aggravated kidnaping, first degree felonies, and one
count of attempted murder, a second degree felony (R. 3-4).

because the relevant facts and the procedural history of this appeal are
intertwined, they are set forth in one section of the State's Brief.
2

In exchange for dismissing the attempted murder charge and one of the aggravated
assault charges, defendant pleaded guilty to one count each of aggravated assault, unlawful
detention, and possession of a controlled substance (R. 15, 20).
Prior to sentencing, defendant submitted a letter to the trial court (R. 42). In the
letter, defendant stated, "I will do everything in my physical power to help Kim get the
counseling she needs.... I realize I deserve to pay for what I did." (id.). On October 7,
1996, the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 1-15 years in prison on the
aggravated assault charge, and six months in the Duchesne County jail on the unlawful
detention and drug charges (R. 47). However, the trial court suspended the sentences and
placed defendant on supervised probation for 36 months, a term that would expire in
October 1999 unless the trial court extended it (R. 47). The trial court also ordered
defendant to "pay total restitution to the victim for any counseling and all costs in
connection therewith" (R. 48).
Defendant did not object to the trial court's order of restitution. While on probation,
defendant paid the bills for Ms. Peterson's counseling as those expenses were incurred (R.
91-92).
On September 10, 1998, the Department of Adult Probation and Parole (APP)
submitted a Progress/Violation Report to the trial court. The report stated that "the
defendant has complied with our agency and completed all terms of the probation
agreement as directed" and requested that "the defendant's probation be terminated

3

satisfactorily" (APP Progress Report p. 1, Addendum A).2 On October 5, 1998, the trial
court initialed the report on a line marked "APPROVED AND ORDERED

"

(id. at 2). The trial court did not enter a signed order terminating probation.
On July 26, 1999, the trial court held a review hearing after defendant requested that
the court clarify the restitution order (R. 56). Defendant asserted that his probation had
been terminated and that he had paid all restitution up to the date of that termination. He
objected to the fact that he had received bills for Ms. Peterson's counseling after the alleged
termination of his probation (R. 56-57). Because defendant's counsel was not present, the
trial court continued the matter (R. 57).
On August 9, 1999, the trial court held a hearing concerning defendant's
responsibility for restitution (R. 83-119). The prosecutor presented a letterfromDr.
Schneiman, who reported that Ms. Peterson had developed post traumatic stress disorder
("PTSD") as a result of defendant's attack (R. 86, unnumbered record: letterfromDr.
Richard Schneiman).3 Ms. Peterson's PTSD was apparently not diagnosed until she began
treatment with Dr. Schneiman (R. 87, unnumbered record: letterfromDr. Schneiman). Dr.
Schneiman reported that Ms. Peterson would require weekly psychotherapy sessions and

2

The progress report is unnumbered in the record on appeal. It appears among
documents affixed to the inside of the top cover of the pleadings file (the "unnumbered
record").
3

By the time Ms. Peterson saw Dr. Schneiman, she had taken the last name of Koch. In
the record, she is referred to as Ms. Koch.
4

monthly medical visits to monitor her medication. At the time of the hearing, Ms. Peterson
had incurred charges of $708 for counseling to treat her PTSD. (R. 90).
Defense counsel maintained that the trial court had released defendant from
probation and that the court did not have jurisdiction to impose restitution (See R. 92). The
court and counsel discussed the issue:
Prosecutor:

Your Honor, I don't think there was ever a hearing on
this. I think AP&P just figured he was doing good.
They didn't need to supervise him.

The Court:

I don't think — I don't think there's an order in the file
actually terminating probation.

Prosecutor:

I believe there is, but it's just one of those —

The Court:

It's a minute entry, an approval.

Prosecutor:

Things approving —

The Court:

Nobody ever prepared an order?

Prosecutor:

Right. Just the AP&P thing they send in.

The Court:

The standard procedure would be that we give notice to
defense counsel and we sign a formal order terminating
and we decide whether it's satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
All I ever did is authorize them to do that and they never
did it. That's what the record would show.
What I'd like to do is put a limitation on this and/or
provide for the defendant to pay for an independent
medical evaluation because there's need to be a
balancing here some way. I'm not going to have him
pay for psychiatric care the rest of his life, obviously.
But I think, too, this victim need to have some help with
these bills and I think her distress is very real. That's

5

where I am at this point. I can either say he has to pay
the six hundred and the ongoing for a year, or if he
want's to pay for an independent medical to try and save
some money, I'll give you a hearing on it.
Defense counsel:

Okay.

(R. 92-93). Although the trial court offered defendant the opportunity to attempt to
mitigate his restitution obligation by obtaining an independent evaluation of Ms. Peterson's
condition, the record does not indicate that defendant took advantage of that opportunity.
At a subsequent hearing on September 20, 1999, the trial court reiterated that the
initialed progress report did not terminate defendant's probation: "As I recall the probation
term was winding down, AP&P recommended termination, I initialed that, and never
received an order

I often approve those, but I anticipate an order — a formal order

terminating satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily as a follow up and that never came" (R. 99,
101).
On October 18, 1999, defense counsel filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial
court's oral finding that it had jurisdiction (R. 72). On November 19, 1999, the trial court
entered a signed order holding that the court had jurisdiction over defendant's restitution
obligation (R. 80). The trial court ordered that
The defendant shall be responsible for restitution for all doctor and
medical bills for the victim through October, 2000. The estimated amount of
such restitution is $6,000. This Order may be modified if the doctors
determine the victim will need additional treatment past October 2000. The
State shall request another hearing to determine additional restitution if it is
determined the victim will require additional treatment.

6

(14).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court terminated his probation when the court
initialed the Adult Probation and Parole Progress/Violation Report ("the AP&P progress
report"). Therefore, he asserts, the court had no jurisdiction to order him to pay additional
restitution. Contrary to defendant's contentions, a form document bearing the judge's
initials but not signed by the judge does not constitute an order. As the trial court
explained, the form was intended to have no such legal effect, and the court's initials
merely indicated to AP&P that the court had reviewed the recommendation and
preliminarily approved the termination of probation.
However, even if defendant's probation had been terminated, under this Court's
precedent, the trial court retained jurisdiction over defendant's restitution obligation
independent of defendant's probation status.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UNSIGNED, INITIALED PROGRESS REPORT DID NOT
CONSTITUTE AN ORDER TERMINATING DEFENDANT'S
PROBATION; FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD
JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE RESTITUTION REGARDLESS
OF DEFENDANT'S PROBATIONARY STATUS
Defendant maintains that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine his
ongoing restitution obligation because he was no longer on probation. Since defendant's
7

probation was not due to expire by its terms until October 1999 and the trial court
commenced its post-sentencing inquiry into defendant's restitution obligation in July 1999,
defendant contends that the AP&P report initialed by the trial court terminated his
probation. However, Utah's court rules and case law do not support his claim.
A.

The Initialed AP&P Progress Report Did Not End Defendant's Probation,
Utah's court rules indicate that judgments must be signed by the trial court to have

legal effect. Rule 58A(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "all judgments shall
be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk." Rule 4-403, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, states that while certain court documents not relevant to this case may be
issued by the court clerk's use of a judge's signature stamp, "[a]ll other documents
requiring the judge's or commissioner's signature shall be personally signed by the judge or
commissioner." Utah Code Jud. Admin. 4-403(3). A "signature" has been defined as "the
name of one as written by oneself." Webster's II New College Dictionary 1027 (1995).
Since initials do not constitute a person's full name, the clear implication of the court rules
cited is that orders affecting the rights of parties must bear the judge's full signature to have
legal effect.
Case law from other jurisdictions explicitly provides that a judge's initials do not
constitute the judge's signature. See Manning v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety,
876 P.2d 667,670 (Okla. 1994) (initialed record entry cannot constitute a judgment);
Martin v. Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Oklahoma Citv. Okla.. 839 P.2d 179, 179-80
8

(Okla. 1992) (minute entry bearing trial court's initials did not commence time for appeal).
See also 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 91 (1994) ("Where the signature of the judge is
necessary to a judgment, a signature by initials only is insufficient."). Cf South Salt Lake
v. Burton. 718 P.2d 405, 406 (Utah 1986) (an unsigned minute entry is not enforceable);
State v. Jimenez. 938 P.2d 264, 264 (Utah 1997) (unsigned minute entry is not a final
judgment for purposes of an appeal); State v. Rawlings. 829 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah App.
1992) (same).
The AP&P progress report was plainly not designed or intended to have legal effect
on the rights and expectations of the parties. The document does not bear a court caption;
instead, it is titled as a progress report. By its terms, the document's purpose is to inform
the court of a defendant's progress while on probation. Furthermore, the trial court stated
that the progress report was not intended to conclude defendant's probation. As the court
explained, its standard procedure for terminating probation entailed receipt of the progress
report, followed by notice to defense counsel and preparation and signing of a formal order
(R. 93, 101). The court's initials on the report merely served to inform Adult Probation and
Parole that the court had seen and approved the recommendation and authorized the agency
to prepare a termination order for the court's signature (id). The report did not end the
probation termination process, but, instead, triggered it.

9

In short, defendant's probation was not terminated by the trial court's initialing of
the probation progress report. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
defendant's remaining restitution obligation.
B.

Even If the Initialed AP&P Progress Report Had Terminated Defendant's
Probation, the Trial Court Retained Independent Jurisdiction Over
Defendant's Restitution Obligation,
"When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary

damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim of
the offense which defendant has been convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i)
(1995). The trial court's obligation to order restitution is nondiscretionary. State v. Stirba.
972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah App. 1998). Even after probation has terminated, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii) (1995) provided that; "the court may retain jurisdiction of the case
and continue defendant on bench probation or place defendant on bench probation for the
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of... restitution."
This Court analyzed the applicable statutes in State v. Dickev. 841 P.2d 1203, 1205
(Utah App. 1992) cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Dickey sought to avoid paying
restitution after his probation had ended by arguing the trial court could not enforce unpaid
restitution except as a condition of probation, and that the court's jurisdiction over his
probation obligation ended with the termination of probation. Id. at 1204. Rejecting
Dickey's argument, the Court observed that under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201, restitution
10

is a "separate and independent component" of the judgment and sentence, and that
restitution can also be imposed as part of probation under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1. Id. at
1207, see also State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 21, ^ 6, 12-13 . Grounding its decision in
the plain language of the restitution statutes, this Court observed that "Utah statutes
[accord] restitution separate legal effect that parallels] probation in sentencing and
judgments." Id. at 1205. The Court noted that the "statutory language expressly
establishes that regardless of whether restitution is made a condition of probation, it has
independent integrity and legal effect." Id at 1207; see also Nones at ^ ("The discretionary
nature of the power conferred by section 77-18-1 (8)(a)(ii) [codified the time relevant to this
appeal at section 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)]... suggests that continuing probation is only one of
the ways a trial court may enforce restitution"). The Court concluded that even though the
trial court's jurisdiction over Dickey's probation had ended, id at 1205, the "trial court's
jurisdiction over defendant to collect restitution continued independent of its authority to
monito3r his compliance with probation conditions." Id. at 1209, see also Nones at If 16
("the trial court, though it did not extend Nones' probation, retained jurisdiction over her
for the collection of restitution").
Dickey and Nones control this case. Defendant attempts to distinguish this case
from Dickey, arguing here, unlike in Dickey, there was "no recorded judgment or lien
against [defendant] that would continue in force after the expiration of the successful
termination of his probation." Appellant's Brief at 9. However, that distinction does not

11

render Dickey's holding inapplicable to this case. Here, as in Dickey and Nones,
defendant's restitution obligation was not satisfied. The terms of the trial court's
restitution order required defendant to pay "total restitution to the victim for any counseling
and all costs in connection therewith." Although the terms of the order made it clear to
defendant that his obligation would be ongoing, defendant did not object to the order or
request a hearing under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e), which provides that "[i]f the
defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall
at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue."4 Utah's
restitution statutes "expressly provide for [a] trial court's jurisdiction over [a] defendant
until payment completion." Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1205 (emphasis added). Since the trial
court had continuing jurisdiction over defendant's probation obligation, and Ms. Peterson
continued to require counseling to help her overcome PTSD caused by defendant's attack,
defendant's restitution obligation had not ended. Therefore, the trial court properly ordered
defendant to pay additional restitution.5

4

Not only did defendant not object to the trial court's restitution order, he invited it.
In his letter to the trial court, defendant pledged to "do everything in my physical power
to help Kim get the counseling she needs" (R. 42).
5

Although defendant now complains that the original restitution order entered at
his sentencing "basically allows or requires a victim to claim restitution against the
Defendant indefinitely," Appellant's Brief at 11, defendant did not object to the
restitution order. And, although defendant claims that the restitution order "is clearly in
opposition to the powers and guidelines given to the District Court for sentencing," he
does not analyze the relevant statutes to explain why his contention on this point is
correct. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a) requires that a party to an appeal must
12

Defendant asserts that the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction to enforce his ongoing
restitution obligation places him in a "perpetual state of limbo." Appellant's Brief at 10.
However, the court commenced its inquiry into defendant's continuing restitution
obligation before defendant's 36-month probation had terminated. The inquiry concerned
defendant's ongoing obligation to pay for "any counseling and all costs in connection
therewith," an obligation to which defendant knew he was subject (R. 80). Furthermore,
the record shows that the court was conscious of defendant's concern that his obligation
would continue indefinitely (R. 91, 93, 101). Accordingly, the court's remedy was
appropriately limited in scope. While the court recognized defendant's legitimate interest
in ultimately seeing an end to his restitution obligation, the court balanced that interest
against Ms. Peterson's need for treatment for a condition that was not predictable at the

provide an argument containing the "contentions and reasons of the [party] with respect
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."
"Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v.
Brvant. 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998).
In fact, the trial court's imposition of restitution at sentencing was an appropriate
exercise of the court's discretion. Because the order required defendant to pay for Ms.
Peterson's counseling on an ongoing basis, defendant was assured that his payments were
applied only for that purpose, and were therefore truly remedial. See Monson v. Carver.
928 P.2d 1017, 1027 (Utah 1996) ("restitution is not a 'punishment' but a civil penalty
whose purpose is entirely remedial," intended "to compensate victims for the harm
caused by a defendant and . . . to spare victims the time, expense and emotional
difficulties of separate civil litigation to recover their damagesfromthe defendant"). The
trial court also appropriately exercised jurisdiction in the court's subsequent restitution
order. Since Ms. Peterson required additional counseling for an unanticipated disorder
that she suffered as a result of defendant's conduct, under the remedial focus of Monson,
the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay additional restitution.
13

time sentence was imposed (R. 93). The court offered defendant the opportunity to obtain
an independent assessment of Ms. Peterson's PTSD to attempt to reduce his payment
obligation, but no separate evaluation was apparently performed. Thus, the court awarded
Ms. Peterson the amount Dr. Schneiman estimated her therapy would cost. Under these
circumstances, the trial court's order did not place defendant in a perpetual state of limbo.
Defendant relies on State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995), and State v.
Green. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), for the proposition that when probation terminates, a trial
court loses the power to assert jurisdiction over a defendant for the purposes of either
extending or revoking probation. Appellant's Brief at 8, 10. Those cases have no
application here because, unlike Dickev and Nones, they do not address a trial court's
independent jurisdiction to enforce a defendant's restitution obligation.
In sum, in accordance with Dickey and Nones, and consistent with the trial court's
order of restitution at sentencing, the trial court correctly exercised jurisdiction over
defendant to determine his remaining restitution obligation.

14

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's order concluding that the trial court had
jurisdiction to enforce restitution.
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Addendum A

STATE OF UTAH

DUCHESS

SEP * " " 9 8

ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
PROTECTED
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT

J0ANNE McKEE

' DEPUTY

BY

"

TO: Eighth District Court - Div. I
Duchesne City, Duchesne County, Utah

REGARDING: ALLEN, Daniel Lee

ATTN: Judge John R. Anderson

CASE NO.: 961800084

FROM: AP&P Region 4 - Provo

OFFENSE: Aggravated Assault, 2nd Felony;
Unlaw Detention and Poss. of a C/S,
both Class B Misdemeanors

DATE: 09/08/1998

OBSCIS: 00089015

PROBATION DATE: 10/07/1996

ADDRESS: 1923 W 500 N, Provo, UT 84601

LEGISLATIVE DATE: 10/06/1999
COMMENTS: On 10/07/1996, Daniel Lee Allen was placed on probation with the following conditions:
1.
Do not use, have in your possession or under your control alcoholic beverages or
frequent places where alcohol is the chief item of sale.
2.
Submit a letter of apology to the victim every 90 days until treatment has been
completed.
3.
Do not use, have in your possession or under your control any non-prescribed,
controlled substances.
4.
Serve 365 days in the Duchesne County Jail.
5.
Enter, participate in and complete an inpatient program counseling or treatment as
directed by Adult Probation and Parole after serving 1 year in jail.
6.
Pay total restitution to the victim for any counseling and all costs in connection therein.
The defendant has complied with our agency and completed all terms of the Probation Agreement as
directed. Therefore, the following recommendation is being submitted to the Court
IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY THE AGENT: NOTIFY SUPERVISOR AND COURT.

-2

RE: ALLEN, DANIEL LEE
RECOMMENDATION: Adult Probation and Parole request that the defendant's probation be terminated
satisfactorily.

AYLOR, SUPERVISOR

^ * W I 5 SCOviiPRfifeATION OFFICER
APPROVED AND ORDERED: J £ ~ 4 ,
DENIED:
L
DATE:
to- <^)^
COMMENTS:

